Militarism with Chinese Characteristics: The Possibility of a Sino-American Conflict due to the Taiwan Strait Crisis
Date: 12 October 2022
Republic of China (Taiwan) President Tsai Ing-wen addressing the Taiwanese 99th Marine Brigade.
Courtesy of Wang Yu Ching (2020): https://flic.kr/p/2jiCD8h
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo has announced that the 20th National Congress will be held on 16th October after their meeting in late August. During the Congress, the Politburo will be ‘elected’ by representatives and the general policy direction and party line of the next five years will be fixed at the time of the power transition. This is the first major leadership change in China since Xi Jinping amended the Chinese constitution, terminating the conditions which limited the number of re-elected terms of the president. If Xi Jinping succeeds to be reelected again, not only would it affect the balance of power between different Party cliques, but his policies pushing for a national rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be continued amid the heated confrontation between Taiwan, its US allies, and Communist China.
While it is impossible to foresee whether a conflict would occur, it is possible to conduct a brief analysis of whether Xi is ready for a direct military confrontation simply based on information available to the general public. By examining the possible motivations of China to engage militarily, the available means at hand for both parties and the power struggle domestically, this article aims to provide an overview of the possibilities of a Taiwan Strait conflict.
The Tides are Turning: Why China is more Prone to Use Military Measures to Annex Taiwan Today
China’s attitude towards Taiwan has been changing. Initially, China’s stance on the Taiwan issue was more prone towards peaceful reunification. During the 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1993, the State Council of the People’s Republic has released a whitepaper in response to Taiwan’s first presidential election. Even though the CCP is sternly opposing Taiwanese Independence, and warned of an attack in case of Taiwan’s de juro independence, it still attempted to negotiate with the Taiwanese. Peaceful reconciliation through ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is the designated solution to the Taiwan issue. By proposing to establish a semi-autonomous region within the People’s Republic, the CCP tried to demonstrate its goodwill to Taipei without losing sight of its agenda. Nevertheless, decades later, while ‘One Country, Two Systems’ still remains a preferable outcome for China, it is more willing to express its possible use of force on Taiwan. I will examine why that is the case by examining both the shifting attitude of the Taiwanese and the growing national power of China.
In Taiwan, the proposed measures of ‘One country, Two Systems’ and the economic benefits of China lost their appeal. During the mid-2000s, approximately 34.2 to 42.5% of the Taiwanese population deemed it best to keep their options open regarding unification, with those supporting independence or to maintain the status quo unable to secure a majority. However, since the Sunflower movement in 2014, the acceptance towards China gradually deteriorated. In 2014, the ruling Nationalist Party attempted to pass the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement to facilitate trade and non-political relations with China. Nevertheless, citizens and university representatives alike worried that domestic middle- to small-sized businesses would suffer an unrecoverable blow if Chinese capital was allowed in under loose control. Hence, students occupied the Legislature in protest of the government’s strong attitude in support of the Agreement. Their actions provoked a strong hand crackdown by the police, which further agitated public discontentment. The Nationalist Party’s appeasement towards its mainland counterpart costs the party its control over the executive. Tsai Ing-wen, then leader of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), took over as the Republic’s president in 2016. However, this was not the only event affecting the view of the Taiwanese towards the CCP and its political promises.
China and Hong Kong’s coercive crackdown towards the anti-extradition protests in 2019 made the Taiwanese public move further away from the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ design. Hong Kong, which had been promised autonomy and self-rule upon its handover to China, was forcefully submitted to Chinese political control under Beijing’s National Security Law. The establishment of a Committee for Safeguarding National Security above the existing system erode Hong Kong’s Common Law practices and deprived Hong Kong people of their guaranteed freedom under the Basic Law. The situation in Hong Kong allowed Tsai, who has taken a strong anti-Chinese stance, to be reelected in 2019, with the DPP standing up even stronger against the Chinese aggressors. Hence, the CCP deems it more difficult to unify Taiwan using peaceful means.
Despite the strong stance of the Taiwanese, China’s growing national strength has allowed it to take a more uncompromising attitude. We could first examine China’s economic and military conditions. During the 1990s, China only had a GDP of only 317.88 USD per capita. It is difficult for a crippled economy to support high-tech military development. The initial variant of the Chinese Dongfeng 5 missile, developed in the 90s, only had a 12,000 km attacking range. However, the US LGM-25C Titan II has already reached 16,000 km in the late 80s. Therefore, the primary objective of the Chinese regime at the time is to make use of every possible means at hand to develop the nation economically and militarily to retain its ruling legitimacy within and bargaining power internationally.
Nonetheless, the current conditions are drastically different. If we measure China’s GDP via Purchasing Power Parity, China has been leading in 2020, with a total of 2.4 trillion USD. Meanwhile, the United States’ ranking has declined to second place, with about 2 trillion USD in place. With the Chinese economy becoming increasingly prosperous, more resources could be devoted to military development. The PRC’s current military spending has reached around $240.3B. Although far less behind the United States’ $734.3B, it still ranks second in the world. Military expenses and concrete combat ability are not directly related, however, the intensive investment could at least demonstrate the dedication of China to build a world-class military. Moreover, its military is far superior in size and equipment when compared to Taiwan. China’s military growth then affects the CCP’s attitude towards the Taiwan strait issue.
Tsai Ing-wen meeting US House of Representatives speaker Pelosi in the Taiwanese Office of the President.
Courtesy of Wang Yu Ching (2022)
Possible Outcomes of A Sino-Taiwanese Military Conflict
Looking at statistics, Taiwan is nowhere in a favourable situation when it comes to military strength. Having a defence budget of only 16.8 billion, Taiwan’s size is only 1/16 of that of its aggressive neighbour. In terms of military supplies, particularly aircraft, which will be used extensively by the Taiwanese to secure air supremacy during the naval battle, there is a huge disparity in number. China possesses more than 3200 aircraft, while Taiwan only has around 741 planes in its air force. As for naval combat, Taiwan’s fleet strength is also significantly weaker than that of Beijing’s, with only 177 in terms of power index in comparison to China’s 777. Hence, in a virtual battlefield where firepower and quantity are all that matter, China has the upper hand. Nevertheless, strategically much more considerations are in play.
Taiwan’s geographical setting and sufficient military preparation may provide the Taiwanese military with a fighting chance. According to Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review, Taiwan aims to mobilise ‘multi-domain deterrence’ to ‘resist the enemy on the opposite shore, attack it at sea, destroy it in the littoral area, and annihilate it on the beachhead’. A three-layered defence will possibly be employed by Taiwan, which includes (1) gaining intelligence advantage to avoid surprise attack; (2) launching a ‘war of the flea’ at sea with the attempt to fight guerrilla warfare with missile-armed small ships with air support; (3) relying on the geography advantage and the vast population and reserve as the backbone.
Hence, for the Chinese to successfully occupy the island, instead of just bombing it to ashes or firing artillery, the Chinese military first needs to destroy Taiwan’s radar installations and aircraft runways, which allows the Taiwanese military to respond quickly in case of an armed attack. Only after these initiatives are carried out, with the Chinese forces gaining air and sea superiority, can the PLA cross the Taiwan strait and attempt to land on the shores on which the RoC army will have surely placed defensive forces on. Following the deadly landing, PRC forces will then face strong resistance from the Taiwanese people and army, which will likely turn the situation into city guerrilla warfare, or extremely possibly, a people’s war, which will make it extremely difficult for the PLA forces to push through.
Again, war simulations and strategic planning could not directly reflect the circumstances in reality. To demonstrate the capability of the Taiwanese themselves, the above demonstration has not taken into account a dominant US military involvement. Without foreign support, it is still possible for Taiwan to defend itself against the third-largest military power in the world.
Now we could go on to consider the case of a United States intervention. Non-militarily, the US can provide active support to Taiwan by supplying weapons, at the same time asserting economic sanctions upon China. On the military aspect, China’s weak naval ability constitutes a fatal injury in military conflicts against the US. The primary point of concern for China is that its navy is technologically inferior to the US, with a smaller quantity of aircraft carriers and cruisers. Its numerical supremacy over the US mainly rests on the number of small surface ships, having 37 corvettes and 86 missile-armed coastal patrol ships.
Nevertheless, in terms of the quality and quantity of large-scale ships, China is extremely overpowered. Owning only one domestically-built carrier with 2 more imported from Russia, China fails to catch up with the US, which now possesses 11 in-service aircraft carriers. Similarly, China’s air carriers are conventionally powered, yet all of the US ones are nuclear-powered. Not only does the energy source differ between Chinese and US carriers, but the number of aircraft that could be onboard as well. While the Chinese domestically-built Shandong can only carry up to 40 aircraft, each of the US carriers is able to load more than 60 aircraft. Unlike the case between Taiwan and China, these figures can cause a direct effect on the possible battle itself as the firepower the US can bring in is significant enough to bring a serious disrupture on China’s naval battle against Taiwan. This is also a factor that the Taiwanese military has taken into account upon drafting their strategic response to China’s aggression.
Upon consideration, Taiwan remains crucial to US’ strategic considerations in the Pacific. In case of a conflict, the US military will most likely dispatch the 7th fleet to provide sustainable air and naval support to Taiwan. As USS Ronald Reagan does not have to constantly refuel itself, it can function as a useful launching pad for airstrikes. None of the Chinese carriers could support constant battle without refuelling. With the initial naval battle failing, it is extremely difficult for the Chinese to land on the island. Overall, the huge chance of failure makes it reasonable to assume that China may either postpone the attack to further develop its naval, aerial and air carrier capacity or, use non-military measures such as blockade or nuclear deterrence to achieve its aim.
The Chinese naval vessels arriving at Israel to celebrate the 20-year cooperation between the two navies.
Courtesy of the Israel Defence Forces (2012): https://flic.kr/p/cQY32G
Epilogue
In general, the chance that a direct Chinese assault on Taiwan will occur within the next presidential term is rather limited. Nevertheless, it is not to say that the Chinese are only spitting out empty words. Xi himself is in a dangerous position, although having largely purged opposing factions, he has made enemies both within the party and outside the society. Hence, it might be necessary for Xi to take concrete steps to pacify domestic discontentment or to find a source of diversion for strong public grievances.
Currently, to appease the increasingly discontent population, Xi has three major devices to appeal to: nationalism, the continued elimination of party corruption and illegal activities of party members, or/and achieving economic revival after the 20th Congress. In terms of nationalism, the empty threats issued by foreign spokesman Zhao Lijian when Pelosi planned her Taiwan visit had enraged Chinese netizens, who considered China’s national dignity trembled by the CCP’s inaction. To resume the legitimacy of the CCP as the rightful saviour of China from foreign oppression, the CCP may employ measures to boast national morale.
On the party discipline aspect, the public does deem the bureaucracy less corrupted under Xi on the national level, yet the cost of intervening in economic activity and strengthening ideological struggle gradually shows. To showcase the superiority of the Chinese methods and to coerce the West into complying with China’s complaints about Western intervention, China has prolonged its Covid lockdown policies for more than 3 years, which cost its economy to deteriorate.
In face of a variety of political problems domestically, Xi may have to resort to the silver bullet if no other solution is successful enough to guarantee his ruling legitimacy. However, socio-party and inter-state relations are affected by a wide range of factors regularly. The best we could hope for is that the Allies can be well-prepared for threats that may loom large in the future.
China’s leaders at the start of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Courtesy of Remko Tanis (2012): https://flic.kr/p/drACZ3
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