Nagorno-Karabakh: The Thorn in the Caucuses
By Ben Galbraith
Date: 11th October 2023
In recent weeks, we have seen the initiation of a military operation undertaken by Azerbaijan upon what the state names ‘terrorists’ and ‘separatists’ in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, one that has an overwhelming majority of ethnic Armenians. Contrary to pre-existing conflict, we seen the international community to be extremely reluctant in denouncing the actions of the Azeri state, whilst even Russia appears to be reluctant to rally behind it has done in the past (though, it bears mentioning, while providing weaponry to both sides). It may thus be the case that we are facing a turning point in the conflict, with the future prospects of the economic and political stability of the Caucuses being at play in the current troop movements within the region. To best outline this topic, we will first turn towards the history of the region itself, before diving into the most recent military action, and potential future consequences that may be associated with it.
The contemporary history of Nagorno-Karabakh originates in 1923 when the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was founded by the Soviet Union. This region, home to a population of around 95% ethnically Armenian citizens, was placed under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. This decision may indeed seem to be a particularly unusual one, given that the region has nearly always been part of Armenia. Yet one ought not to forget that the concept of population transfer was long a policy of the USSR, with this particularly culminating in the Crimean Tatars, but also being a causal factor behind the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The concept of distributing potentially problematic groups has always been one that ultimately enables a state to ensure greater dominance by sowing discord amongst certain groups, something which proved to be the case in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1989, the number of ethnic Armenians in the region was around 74%. Despite forming the ethnic majority, there was great discontent at the inability to have one’s language and culture preserved under the auspices of the AzSSR, with a burgeoning anti-Azeri sentiment which pushed citizens to riot and stage protests in favour of being placed under Armenian sovereignty (arguably more for ethnic and cultural reasons than a particular desire to be under Armenian rule). It was on this political backdrop that, upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the officially independent Nagorno-Karabakh region. This resulted in Armenia controlling the region, as well as around 20% of Azerbaijan. A bilateral ceasefire was thus established by Russia that year, which rendered Nagorno-Karabakh de facto independent, whilst depending on Armenia for economic, political and military issues. Such an agreement was the norm until 2020, with there being numerous intermittent clashes punctured the stability of the region. It was in September 2020 when large-scale troop movements took place on both sides, amounting to 7000 military and civilian casualties, and both sides refusing to abide by UN, US and Russian pressure to hold talks until 9th November 2020 when Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the region. It was at this point that Azerbaijan reclaimed most of the territory it had lost, including large swathes of Nagorno-Karabakh. Whilst much can be said regarding the developments in conflict, notably drone warfare, and the means through which this influenced the developments of the tensions in the region, due to space constraints we will move towards the most contemporary instances of conflict. In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces overwhelmed the defenders of the territory, citing terrorist threat and a need to disable pre-existing military equipment belonging to Armenia, with around 200 individuals dying in the conflict. In the wake of this military intervention, and the subsequent announcement by the region’s authorities that it would cease to exist in 2024, around 120,000 ethnic Armenians immediately fled to Armenia, fearing persecution and retribution, whilst officials attempt (in vain) to demand security guarantees for remaining citizens.
This brings us to the time of writing this article, Azerbaijani dominance seems assured throughout the region, primarily through Iranian support, all the while the international community remains inclined to avoid broaching the topic. This appears to be the new norm, likely due to the fact that the trade of oil between the EU and Azerbaijan totalled over $32.45B, whilst a 2022 trade deal arranged the imports of Azeri natural gas would reach 20 billion cubic metres (12bcm in 2022). Given the pressure that Russia is placing on the moral and economic feasibility of importing gas and oil from the state, especially *repetition the on-going war in Ukraine, the future dependence upon Azerbaijan seems likely. In this vein, the moral principles of such institutions and states are likely to continue wavering in the face of domestic torment should arrangements not be made to find alternative sources for crude resources. The influence that this conflict has had on the EU and further afield is rather obvious, but the role of Russia seems rather more interesting. In a bid to maintain the former political dominance it held during the cold war, we can notice the conspicuous lack of Russian narratives on this conflict. In an interview with POLITICO, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan went so far as to declare that the peacekeeping effort had failed, with Moscow turning its back on its traditional horse in the race to avoid the alienation of Azerbaijan and Turkey, who have become strategically important partners since the start of the war in Ukraine. In addition to this, an incident took place in which Russian peacekeepers were killed by Azerbaijani forces, something which was recognised by Moscow, and subsequently apologised for by Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s President, yet Russia elected to not decry such actions, choosing to remain silent, despite the deputy chief of the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces allegedly being one of those killed. It is thus somewhat evident that the humiliation associated with losing soldiers and being unable, or unwilling, to stand up to a relatively minor ally, indicates an unwillingness amidst the political leadership to direct its efforts elsewhere other than Ukraine. Given that the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CTSO) has also failed to enact any substantial sanctions on Azerbaijan, or rally around Armenia, draws to light the seeming inability of this Russia-led organisation to effectively swing around its political weight in the Caucuses (and, arguably, in Central Asia). Armenia’s future thus looks bleak. This spells a future in which Europe is going to to become all the more dependent on Azerbaijan, and may be loathe to contest its actions. Whilst Russia appears to have put aside its commitments to the country, focussing its might on Ukraine.
Looking towards the future of the Caucuses, and perhaps the wider post-Soviet sphere, the current actions of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh will almost definitely pique the interest of similar regimes. Looking to the ‘-stans’, notably Kazakhstan, the allure of increasing the sale of their oil and gas to Europe will be of great interest, ‘especially’ for business opportunities, all the while having little concern for gross human rights abuses taking place, safe in the knowledge that money washes away such sins. Given that President Tokayev of Kazakhstan has expressed a desire to collaborate further with Germany and Kazakhstan, this hypothesis seems to be all the more likely to manifest itself (Satubaldina, 2023). The current moral grandstanding of the EU creates a bleak future for advocates of human rights around the world.
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