The Kremlin is Low on Gas: How Moscow’s Chokehold on Energy Fails to Curtail Western Support towards Ukraine
Date: 20 September 2022
Ukrainian tanks passing through a wheat field during an Anti-terriorist operation in Eastern Ukraine.
Courtesy of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2014): https://flic.kr/p/GnU689
Who will be the victor of the Russo-Ukrainian War? That is a question that has been wandering in many people’s mind ever since the Russian invasion in February. Recent changes on the Eastern front might provide some insight into this fascinating matter. Ever since 29th August, the Ukrainians have launched an impressive counteroffensive against the Russians in regions such as Kharkiv and Kherson. Major transportation and supply hubs, namely Izyum and Kupiansk in Eastern Ukraine, have returned to the hands of the Ukrainian forces.
In this article, the author will attempt to examine how US and European support plays an important role in Ukraine’s success in holding its ground against a major military power, and explores whether the upcoming winter will impact the antagonistic policies of European countries against Russia.
Run and Gun: How NATO Military Aid Supports Ukrainian Defence
Lieutenant General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Chief of Defence of Ukraine, joining a Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session of NATO.
Courtesy of NATO (2022): https://flic.kr/p/2mXQ9ps
The military aid from NATO provided a substantial advantage to Ukraine’s war effort. In accordance with the 2021 Military Strength Ranking, Russia was in 2nd place with a Power Index of 0.0791 (0 is presumed as the perfect condition), while the Ukrainians were only listed as the 25th nation on the list, with a Power Index of 0.4396. The primary weakness in Ukraine’s army lies with its insufficient artillery firepower and weak air defence abilities. We will take air defence as an example to illustrate how NATO support is impartial to Ukraine’s defences.
Ukraine’s air defence system is largely erected during the Soviet era. Its long-range system, the S-200, has retired because of its immobility as well as its old age. However, the mid-range system in operation, the S-300s, is not designed to support multi-layered defence, and its failure in detecting fighters and projectiles with anti-radiational ability makes the equipment extremely vulnerable to Russian airstrikes. The fact that the systems are products of the Soviet military makes it easier for the Russians, who are familiarized with the weaknesses and specs., to blind the Ukrainians using electronic warfare.
The Biden administration is making effort to target the weaknesses of the Ukrainian system. For instance, the Norwegian-made National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), a solid defence system against aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles will arrive in Ukraine within 60 Days. Although the S-300 has a longer range, the Western reserve for S-300 missiles is not sufficient, and Ukraine’s own stockpile is inadequate as well. Hence, NASAMS serves as a feasible replacement for the aged Soviet system. With equipment and training from NATO countries, Ukraine’s power index decreased by 26% and moved up 3 places in this year’s military strength ranking. It could be expected that more NATO weaponry and equipment are on their way to the Ukrainian battlefield. While Russia still has an overall stronger military power than Ukraine, its declining performance in face of Ukraine’s growing capabilities proved to be worrying for Moscow.
Although Putin has boasted having weapons that are ‘years, perhaps even decades’ ahead of rivals, the potential capabilities of the Russian military equipment has been failed to be put to good use. In terms of air power, the performances of Russia’s missiles are disappointing, with more than 60% daily failure rate emerging from certain types. Experts assume that serious systematic corruption within the Russian armed forces affected weaponry production, to an extent to which they called the military demonstration of the Russian forces before the war a form of ‘self-deception’ (Dalsjo, Jonsson & Norberg, 2022). Not just the weapons’ quality are at stake, but also the quantity. Russian Long-range land-attack cruise missiles, such as the Raduga Kh-555, are being used up at rapid speed, with almost 60% of the stock being expended in July. The Russians are not able to restock their weaponry due to Western sanctions. Therefore, by supporting weapons to Ukraine, as well as asserting sanctions against Russia, the US and its allies contributed massively to strengthening Ukraine’s military power.
A military personnel staring at a Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System.
Courtesy of Wikimedia (2010)
Energy on Hold: How the Russo-Ukrainian War Impact Europe
However, one of the major concerns of the Ukrainian military is whether the support from its Western allies, the European states, in particular, will be shaken by the Russian energy ban once winter strikes. Even MI6 chief Richard Moore admitted that, in winter ,where there is an ‘atmosphere with the sort of pressure on gas suppliers and all the rest, we’re in for a tough time’.
There are two aspects that one should consider when examining Russia’s energy control. First and foremost, one should be concerned about the increase in energy prices, which directly affect the living standards of citizens. Since the beginning of the war, as a response to the EU economic sanctions against Russia, the Russian state-owned energy tycoon Gazprom has halted supplies to any countries refusing to pay in rubles.Up till July, the decrease in Russian energy export has reached 35 per cent when compared to the same time last year. However, as of 2021, 40% of gas consumed in the EU came from Russia. The sudden scarcity of gas and electricity resulted in a sharp rise in energy charges.
The soaring energy prices then resulted in broader economic inflation as the disposable incomes of regular households did not go up accordingly with the energy prices. If we examine the inflation rates for European countries, the situation is looking rather grim. In Germany, a country that depended on Russian gas for a total of 55% of the overall consumption before the war, a year-on-year inflation rate of 7.9% was recorded. Normally, the average inflation rate in Germany was just 2.6% per year from 1960 to 2021. The higher inflation rate does result in a drop in public support, something that political parties in the Western democratic nations are concerned about the most. However, the degree of impact varies across countries. In Germany, the support rate of Chancellor Scholz dropped from 46% in March to 25% in August, which is a massive deterioration. Nevertheless, in the UK, where the inflation rate year over year reached 9.8%, the approval rate just dropped from 23% to 18%.
We have to take into account the fact that public relations strategies, governmental action against inflation, as well as the general public perception of the government all affect the degree of governmental approval. If the government succeeds to provide appropriate remedies and subsidies for the general public, even though its support rate will not be high, it could still suppress large-scale social unrest.
Federal Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz at a news conference following Russian-German talks in Februrary.
Courtesy of wikimedia (2022)
Winter is Coming: Why Russia is not Necessarily Winning the Energy Battle
Immediately, governments are working on energy price caps and financial assistant policies in order to face the energy crisis. Both Liz Truss, the new British Prime Minister, as well as Germany’s Scholz both promised to limit the energy price. However, the crux of the matter is on finding new sources of energy supply. Germany has been building up its gas storage, with the aim of reaching 85% storage capacity by October, according to Economy Minister Robert Habeck. German Official figures also demonstrated that only 9.5% of consumption in August came from Russia, showing the increasing determination of Berlin to cut ties with Moscow. Germany will also halt the retirement of its nuclear power plants, with 2 remaining as energy reserves until the summer of 2023.
Besides striving for self-sufficiency, other sources of energy, including reserves and foreign aid, could be used to temporarily ease the energy demand. The IEA, a group of oil importing countries, agreed to release 120 m barrels worth of oil from their reserve, while the Biden administration ordered a major release of oil from American stocks. The above measures would allow the EU to cut close to 90% of oil brought from Russia. More recently, the G7 has decided to enforce a price cap on oil trade deals with Russia. Judging by Germany’s determination to terminate Russian affiliations and to turn to other sources of energy supply, it is not surprising that other nations less affected will also be moving in this direction. Since the process to increase energy self-sufficiency is ongoing, with the Ukrainians winning massive battles against the Russians, it is rather unlikely for European states to abandon Ukraine.
Public polls also seem to show that the general public remains supportive of imposing sanctions on Russia. In July, 48 % of Britons opted to continue the sanctions even if the cost-of-living increases, in oppose to 38% who did not support the sanctions. Similarly, although the Germans are extremely unsatisfied with the SPD, around 60% said that they support measures against Russia even if energy supplies are affected. The results reflect that the dissatisfaction towards one’s own government due to the energy shortage does not necessarily correlates with a decrease in hostility against Russia. More possibly, the general public may even further dislike Russia and Putin, and remains supportive of the antagonistic policies against Moscow.
Epilogue
The Ukrainian forces successfully retain 6000 square kilometres of land, which formerly took the Russians 6 months to obtain, and their success is the result of a collaborative effort between NATO and the Ukrainian military.Even though Russia attempts to curtail European support towards Ukraine, it seems that its schemes on energy control is not functioning as well as Putin expects it to be. As of this moment, due to Russia’s humiliating defeat in Kherson and Kharkiv, Western morale is as high as ever. The continued advancement of the Ukrainian army may possibly strengthen Western aid, instead of the other way around.
Nevertheless, as Moore has noted, the conflict was ‘obviously not over’. Amid an ongoing conflict, changes could occur at any second due to unexpected circumstances. Hence, it is rather safe to say that we should remain observant of the situation, albeit in a more optimistic manner than before.
The Gösgen Nuclear Power Plant in Germany.
Courtesy of the IAEA Imagebank (2007): https://flic.kr/p/doNK2u
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